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On one rather typical page of her comprehensive survey of the life of
the late Hannah Arendt, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl describes the style of
review "that became characteristic of" her subject.' Let us start at the top
of the page. The author begins by referring to Arendt's fruitful acquaint-
ances with Kurt Wolff, the founder of Pantheon Books, and with the
Schockens of Schocken Publishing, who invited Arendt to meet T.S. Eliot
at a business meeting where Eliot "was received like a traveling sales-
man." This allusion enables Young-Bruehl to make a not-altogether
graceless transition to Arendt's 1945 review of Raissa Maritain's book,
Adventures in Grace.2 The transition consists of recording the facts that
(i) the Schockens missed the opportunity to publish some translations of
German poetry by Randall Jarrell; (ii) Jarrell, whom Arendt came to
know well, substituted for Margaret Marshall as book-review editor of
the Nation during 1946; (iii) Marshall had the previous year written in
high praise' of an article by Arendt;' and (iv) Marshall had subsequently
asked Arendt to review the Maritain book.
In the page's final paragraph, we come to the matter of Arendt's char-
acteristic reviewing style. Her response to Marshall's invitation was, ac-
cording to Young-Bruehl, a "long general discussion" in which the book
itself "was briefly mentioned." Her review surveyed neo-Catholic thought
in France (as well as G.K. Chesterton's thought in England) with special
reference to some of its quasi-Fascistic tendencies, and focused on the ex-
ceptional case of Jacqlues Maritain, who was (although Young-Bruehl
does not say so) Raissa Maritain's husband. It is mentioned that Arendt
had once been acquainted briefly with Maritain through the good offices
of (we now move to the first few lines of the next page) Paul Tillich.
t Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University.
1. E. YOUNG-BRUEHL, HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD 190 (1982) [hereinafter
cited by page number only].
2. Arendt, Christianity and Revolution, NATION, Sept. 22, 1945, at 288.
3. See Marshall, Notes by the Way, NATION, Mar. 17, 1945, at 308, 308-09.
4. Arendt, Approaches to the "German Problem," PARTISAN REV., Winter 1945, at 93.
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What Arendt found "embarrassing" about Jacques Maritain, despite her
admiration for him, we are told, was his compelling need for truth. This,
she thought, was unphilosophical, because "[p]hilosophy concerned with
truth ever was and probably always will be a kind of docta ignoran-
tia-highly learned and therefore highly ignorant."5 The paragraph con-
cludes with a reflection of the extent to which Jarrell must have appreci-
ated this bon mot.
This single segment of just over a page captures the essence of the book
itself, Arendt's thought, and the dilemma confronting any serious reviewer
of the book. These three topics will serve as the divisions of the remainder
of the present Review. Inasmuch as it will heavily emphasize the book at
hand, the pattern and thrust of my Review will therefore diverge signifi-
cantly from the reviewing style that, according to her biographer, Hannah
Arendt established in her 1945 treatment-or rather nontreatment-of
Adventures in Grace.
I. The Essence of the Book
To call Young-Bruehl's effort comprehensive is in one sense a drastic
understatement. The page I have summarized succeeds in dropping a
number of very well-known names from several spheres of endeavor and
in giving the reader a good sense of some of Arendt's own principal preoc-
cupations. It also offers brief but breathtaking overviews of an important
cultural phenomenon (neo-Catholic thought), of an important philosopher
(Jacques, though not Raissa, Maritain), and of the nature of philosophy
itself. Most of the book is written in the same vein.
Its subject, Hannah Arendt, lived an extremely full life. She was deeply
involved with, and touched by, most of the major developments of the first
three-quarters of this century. She was born in 1906 in what was then
Kdnigsberg. During the Weimar era she became a university student of
theology and philosophy at several German universities, where she studied
with Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, and Karl Jaspers. After her
first husband fled to Paris, she remained in Berlin to shelter refugees from
the police during the early period of Nazi hegemony; she eventually left
Germany and, after a time, became the overseer of the Baroness Ger-
maine de Rothschild's contributions to Jewish charities. She fled once
more after the German occupation of France, managing to reach the
United States via Portugal in 1941 with her new husband, Heinrich
Bliicher. Thereafter, New York City remained her home base until her
death in 1975. Her early jobs in the United States included part-time
teaching, writing, the executive directorship of the Commission on Euro-
5. P. 191.
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pean Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, and a senior editorship at Schock-
en. Later, she held senior faculty appointments at the New School for
Social Research in New York (where Elisabeth Young-Bruehl was one of
her doctoral student) and on the Committee for Social Thought of the
University of Chicago, as well as visiting appointments at Princeton and
elsewhere. She lectured extensively and wrote a number of books; the first
to be widely read was The Origins of Totalitarianism, first published in
1951. She was involved in numerous controversies; the most acerbic and
best known surrounded her analysis of the trial of Adolph Eichmann by
the State of Israel. Honorary degrees and other distinguished awards were
heaped upon her in her later years.6
That is the bare factual material with which Young-Bruehl had to
work. As she acknowledges, she was able to interview a number of those
who knew Arendt, and she had access to considerable archival material,
especially letters. Finally, Young-Bruehl was both well acquainted with
Arendt and shared many of her intellectual, and especially her philosophi-
cal, interests.
7
What has emerged? The book is eminently readable, filled with facts,
comprehensive, and well annotated-just what we expect from a good bi-
ography. It contains some fascinating revelations, with just a soupgon of
scandal about some of them. (The short, sentimental account of a brief
romantic connection between the young Hannah Arendt and Martin
Heidegger is the most "sensational," and the revelation most frequently
noted by readers.) The book is intentionally kind and respectful toward its
subject without being excessively reverent. It is similarly pious, in the
older and more positive sense of that word, toward Heinrich Blicher, Ar-
endt's husband and companion for nearly half of her life.
Assuming, then, that one has not approached this book in the hope of
participating in a grand orgy of iconoclasm, what more could a reader ask
for? Young-Bruehl sensed at least part of the answer. In her preface, she
alludes to Arendt's rigidly-maintained separation of the public and the
private and to her strongly-held aversion to writing intimately about
others.9 Arendt surrounded herself with friends-a number of whom her
biographer was able to interview-and yet a certain sense of distance re-
mains. The reader is at the end tempted to ask, "Yes, but what was
Hannah Arendt really like?" This phenomenon suggests many interesting
conceptual problems in psychology and in the philosophy of mind.
6. A few months before her death, for instance, the Government of Denmark named her recipient
of its Sonning Prize for Contributions to European Civilization. Pp. 460-63.
7. Young-Bruehl's own study of Jaspers' thought, E. YOUNG-BRUEHL, FREEDOM AND KARL JAS-
PERS'S PHILOSOPHY (1981), was published in tandem with her Arendt biography.
8. Pp. 49-50.
9. Pp. xvi-xvii.
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In Arendt's case, there is an overwhelmingly obvious source of informa-
tion about what she really was like-her extensive public writings. This is
an even more appropriate direction in which to turn if one is, as I am,
highly skeptical about Arendt's view of the sharp separability of the pub-
lic and the private spheres. But in this respect as well, Young-Bruehl's
effort is somewhat disappointing. True, she proposes some themes to
unify the roots and contours of Arendt's thought; the idea of the Jew as
"conscious pariah," for instance, developed by Arendt in her biography of
Rahel Varnhagen, a famous Berlin salon figure of the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries,"0 is certainly important and useful." Young-
Bruehl also dutifully summarizes the main points of all of Arendt's im-
portant works, but these summaries do not pretend to be highly system-
atic, comprehensive, or analytic. The extant secondary literature on Ar-
endt's thought receives no systematic treatment-a surprising omission in
view of the book's overall length and its otherwise extensive documenta-
tion. In fact, behind Young-Bruehl's objective reporting of Arendt's intel-
lectual positions and those of her principal critics, the reader senses only a
highly qualified enthusiasm for her written work,"2 as distinguished from
her role as mentor and friend.
The "more" for which the reader might reasonably have wished, then,
is a more penetrating insight into Hannah Arendt as a thinker. Instead
we observe a person of courage, energy, and very strong convictions on
most of the great issues of her times, who had many interesting friends
and acquaintances, wrote many essays and books, gave many lectures, and
eventually became quite famous. All of these qualities and activities re-
quire some thought, but taken together they do not necessarily add up to a
portrait of a great thinker. As the more-or-less random page summarized
at the outset 'of this Review suggests, the essence of Young-Bruehl's book,
fascinating and often even riveting as it may be, is its chattiness. And
while the book does refer to some of the tributes made to Arendt as a
thinker, it does not itself constitute another such tribute.
10. See H. ARENDT, RAHEL VARNHAGEN: THE LIFE OF A JEWISH WOMAN 199-228 (R. Winston
& C. Winston trans. 1974). The manuscript was actually begun in 1930.
11. It also serves as the title of a posthumously-published anthology of some of Arendt's many
articles on Jewish issues. H. ARENDT, THE JEW AS PARIAH (1978).
12. Reporting a lecture given by Arendt at the height of the controversy over her Eichmann book,
for instance, Young-Bruehl comments: "Had it been clear in Arendt's book that her concern was for
what she later called 'personal responsibility under dictatorship' and not obedience to any human
interpretation of the Divine Will, some of her critics might have respected her stance, as the students
who heard her did." P. 366. After reviewing some of the widely varied criticisms that were made of
On Revolution, Young-Bruehl admits, "Arendt's portrait of the Founding Fathers was fabulous in the
literal sense of the word," although Young-Bruehl then goes on to defend the value of political fables.
P. 403.
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II. The Essence of Hannah Arendt's Thought
One should read into this subtitle a certain element of irony. Taken
literally, it would be inexcusably pretentious to apply such a heading to a
body of theory noteworthy for its meandering, its frequent obscurity,
and-perhaps most salient of all-its inability to be pigeonholed. Perhaps
the first difficulty lies in trying to assign an appropriate disciplinary label
to Arendt's body of writing.
Young-Bruehl records an excerpt from a 1964 television interview in
which Arendt denied that she was a philosopher any longer (she admitted
only to having studied philosophy at one time) and claimed instead to be a
political theorist.13 But Arendt's last and unfinished work, The Life of the
Mind, was, as Young-Bruehl points out in the same passage, a return to
issues that no one would deny are central to philosophy. In any case,
despite the distinction Arendt drew in the interview, political theory of the
normative sort with which she was concerned is usually regarded as akin
to, if not a branch of, philosophy.
If, then, Arendt was always a sort of philosopher malgr6 elle-albeit a
very nonprofessional philosopher, who did not know, when invited to de-
liver the prestigious Gifford Lectures, what they were 1 -what sort of
philosopher was she? To those who think of their approach to philosophy
as "analytic"-precise, sensitive to the nuances of words-Arendt's style
is foreign. Young-Bruehl reports a vitriolic posthumous attack on Arendt's
work by Stuart Hampshire, who identifies himself with the analytic ap-
proach;15 while somewhat extreme in the level of irritability it exhibits,
this attack is not wholly unrepresentative. Hampshire found it incompre-
hensible that Arendt had been taken so seriously in the United States."'
On the other hand, while having more roots in the continental tradition
of philosophy known as phenomenology, Arendt is said to have denied
that her phenomenology was based on that of Edmund Husserl, the
founder of the contemporary phenomenological movement.1 , If indeed she
did say this, she was surely correct. Husserl was preoccupied with ques-
tions of method and was, in his own way, just as precise as any analytic
philosopher, whereas Arendt eschewed questions of methodology as much
as possible.
Yet Arendt was greatly concerned about distinctions and the meanings




16. Id.; see Hampshire, Metaphysical Mists, OBSERVER (London), July 30, 1978, at 26, col. 7.
17. P. 405.
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important books were organized.18 But her way of drawing these distinc-
tions eventually must prove frustrating to every reader. C.B. Macpher-
son's characterization of this approach, made during an exchange with
Arendt at a symposium devoted to her thought, expresses this frustration
well:
This intellectual practice-and it's a very enlivening practice, be-
cause it starts off, or should start off, all kinds of controversy-is still
rather a curious practice: of taking a word that has perhaps more
than one meaning in the ordinary understanding and giving it a very
special meaning and then proceeding from there to reach striking,
paradoxical conclusions."
Assigning Hannah Arendt a place within the contemporary ideological
spectrum is equally frustrating, as Young-Bruehl frequently acknowl-
edges. She was a "liberal" who favored states' rights and attacked pro-
gressive education during the controversy over the integration of public
schools in Little Rock.20 She was deeply influenced in many ways by the
Marxist tradition, but she steadfastly insisted, against the central insight
of that tradition, on separating political issues, in which she was profes-
sionally interested, from economic issues, in which she most certainly was
not. She was a tireless worker for Jewish organizations, yet her treat-
ments of Eichmann (said by her to exemplify "the banality of evil") and
of the relationships between sometimes pusillanimous European Jewish
councils and Nazi officials led some to accuse her of anti-Semitism. She
was the first woman to receive a number of appointments and honors, and
yet she was quite unsympathetic to the women's movement21 and appar-
ently not especially sensitive to the problems of other women intellectu-
als.22 A complete list of such contradictions would be very long indeed.
Arendt's comparative insouciance toward logical consistency and com-
pleteness can be documented not only across the span of her works, but
also within most of the individual works themselves. A number of critics
have noted the highly problematic way in which Arendt conflates Nazism
18. In The Human Condition, the outstanding example of Arendt's concern for such distinctions,
she discusses, inter alia, the difference between the public and the private; work, labor, and action; the
political and the social; and power and violence.
19. Arendt, On Hannah Arendt, in HANNAH ARENDT: THE RECOVERY OF THE PUBLIC WORLD
322 (M. Hill ed. 1979).
20. See pp. 308-18.
21. See pp. 96-97.
22. "She was suspicious of women who 'gave orders,' skeptical about whether women should be
political leaders, and steadfastly opposed to the social dimensions of Women's Liberation. Her own
motherly advice to younger women was as bourgeois and conventional in its details as it was, in
important matters, open-minded and unsentimental." P. 238 (footnote omitted). Her extremely cava-
lier treatment of Raissa Maritain in the 1945 review, supra note 2, strikes me as a good example of
Arendt's insensitivity to the problems faced by women intellectuals.
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and Stalinism in The Origins of Totalitarianism without much discussion
of the second phenomenon. 3 One avowedly sympathetic critic, Margaret
Canovan, expresses very well the evaluative problem to which even a par-
tial listing of Arendt's many sins against the usual canons of scholarship
and reasoning inevitably points:
We have raised . . . so many objections to Hannah Arendt's book
that the reader may by this time be asking whether this enterprise is
not self-destructive: if it is indeed possible to quarrel with her thesis
on so many grounds, is it worth reading, much less worth writing
about?
24
The question Canovan answers affirmatively was posed apropos The Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism, but it could have been asked of any of Arendt's
longer, theoretical works.
Perhaps the most concise clue to the essence of Arendt's thought is to be
found in a sentence in her brief, obscure article referred to at the begin-
ning of this Review. "Philosophy concerned with truth," she said there,
"ever was and probably always will be a kind of docta ignorantia-highly
learned and therefore highly ignorant."' 25 This statement is playful and
paradoxical, at once extremely dogmatic (despite the qualifying "proba-
bly") and self-undermining. Its allusion to the skeptical tradition of Eras-
mus and certain other Renaissance figures puts into question the value of
the author's own erudition as well as any claims to truth she herself might
want to make. It is not a remark with which representatives of any of the
mainstream traditions of philosophy that flourished during Arendt's life-
time would have been comfortable," but it is extremely thought-provoking
within the context of the overall discussion of neo-Catholic thought in
general and of Jacques Maritain in particular. What distinguished
Hannah Arendt as a philosopher and political theorist, in short, was
neither her vast and vaunted erudition (which was often displayed with
great imprecision) nor her systematic concepts (which could not easily be
sustained against a concentrated conceptual attack), but rather her awe-
some capacity to stimulate others to reflection. Such a capacity is seldom
rewarded, but it was in the case of Hannah Arendt.
23. See Crick, On Rereading The Origins of Totalitarianism, in HANNAH ARENDT: THE RECOV.
ERY OF THE PUBLIC WORLD, supra note 19, at 27-47.
24. M. CANOVAN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HANNAH ARENDT 47 (1974). This is one of
several important secondary works on Arendt's thought receiving no recognition from Young-Bruehl.
25. Arendt, supra note 2, at 289.
26. Her remark does bear some affinity, however, in spirit if not in style to the current wave of
French "deconstructionism" now beginning to make inroads into the American consciousness. See R.
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
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III. The Essence of the Reviewer's Dilemma
The reviewer's dilemma is, I think, somewhat unusual. Initially, there
would not seem to be much doubt as to the desirability of taking note of
this book in this journal. The book is a definitive biography of someone
who at the time of her death was arguably the best known and certainly
the most highly honored political theorist in her adopted country, and who
also had a very prominent international reputation. Yet the book espouses
no major controversial theses about its often highly controversial subject
that might have evoked stimulating debate. Before reading Young-
Bruehl's work, I was displeased with the first important review of it I
read, by Peter Berger,2 7 and infuriated at the second, by Arendt's former
acquaintance, Alfred Kazin,28 for their apparent superficiality. Neither
seemed to make much of Arendt's political philosophy. Both were at least
slightly patronizing about her central thought, and each referred, with
more apparent enthusiasm, to personal encounters with her.29 I reflected
on the irony that the New York Review of Books, in which Kazin's re-
view appeared, had frequently served as a vehicle for some of Arendt's
most intellectually provocative shorter pieces. I now understand how these
reviews came about. One of my first impulses in beginning to compose
this Review was to recall in detail the few occasions on which I had some
fleeting contact with Arendt-the circumstances, my reactions, and so
on."0 This biography strongly encourages that sort of reaction.
A reviewer in this situation might, to be sure, choose to ignore the biog-
raphy for the most part and concentrate exclusively on systematically ex-
27. Berger, A Woman of This Century, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1982, § 7 (Book Review), at 1.
28. Kazin, Woman in Dark Times, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 24, 1982, at 3.
29. Berger took her warm greeting of the German philosopher Jilrgen Habermas, whom she met
on the occasion that he recounts, as symbolic of an intellectual torch-passing. See Berger, supra note
27, at 21. This seems to me to be highly distortive of reality; while Habermas does occasionally refer
to Arendt and the two do share a somewhat similar intellectual heritage, the disagreements between
them are considerable. See J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 201
(1979).
30. I shall yield to the impulse to the extent of recalling my concluding comments on her lecture,
"Reflections on Violence," a short, early version of On Violence, given as part of a Yale Philosophy
Department series on revolution:
[W]e all sometimes tire of paradoxes .... On the other hand, perhaps "truth" itself consists
of a series of paradoxes; this is the lesson that [Hannah Arendt] seemed at times to be imply-
ing. And so, like much of the audience, I drew from her lecture personal conclusions that were
certainly not parts of its content. Of all our lecturers on revolution thus far . . . , Hannah
Arendt stood at once for the most and for the least. Vigorous, opinionated, forthright, enor-
mously well read, widely experienced . . . , she appeared as perhaps the closest thing to an
absolute authority on the subject that the academic world can muster today. And yet, as she
pointed out in answer to one of her questioners, the very concept of authority is currently in
the process of disappearing. And those delicately abstract paradoxes of hers teetered perilously
close to the brink of an intellectual void in which all cats, both revisionist and revolutionary,
are gray.
McBride, Reflections on Reflections on Revolution, NEW J., Dec. 8, 1968, at 13, 15.
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pounding and criticizing some aspect of Arendt's political theory. But such
criticism would come relatively cheap, there would be little novelty to it,
and it would be beside the point as far as Young-Bruehl's principal labors
are concerned.
It would have been even more tempting, given the readership of this
journal, to concentrate on the rare occasion on which Hannah Arendt con-
tributed to jurisprudence. The most interesting and obvious instance of
this is the use that was made of Arendt's ideas during the constitutional
controversy concerning the 1954 McCarthyite law that sanctioned the de-
nationalization of naturalized citizens found guilty of subversive activi-
ties."1 Arendt's personal experience of statelessness as a result of Nazi
persecution had made her very sensitive to the issue and highly skeptical
of abstract talk about the "Rights of Man" when they have not been codi-
fied. 2 Stephen Pollak's analysis, in this journal, of the legislation in ques-
tion frequently cited Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism33 and helped to
undergird the Warren Court's view of the law's unconstitutionality. Years
later, in her report of the Eichmann trial, Arendt made important juris-
prudential observations concerning the problem of mens rea in cases like
Eichmann's and the putative need for a more developed international
"law of humanity."3 But no one would want to pretend that Arendt was
a sophisticated legal philosopher or a skilled legal craftsperson, and so to
have focused on these extremely brief references in Young-Bruehl's book
and on their possible implications would have been, once again, grossly to
distort both the book's message and my assessment of Arendt's
significance.
So the reviewer's dilemma is actually twofold. First, one must choose
whether to remain within the perceived spirit of the biography and hence
to treat the actual detailed contents of Arendt's extensive intellectual writ-
ings as relatively secondary, or to offer a concentrated critical analysis of a
few aspects of the latter as central regardless of Young-Bruehl's implicit
message. Second, since either approach would, I believe, put seriously into
question the very high reputation Arendt has enjoyed as a thinker, one
must choose whether to agree with Stuart Hampshire that the learned
American public has been deceived, or to point to some consideration that
will vindicate both that public and Hannah Arendt herself. I hope, though
without great confidence, to have transcended these dilemmas.
It would be very attractive to conclude with some sociological specula-
31. See p. 293.
32. See p. 256.
33. Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1190 n.139, 1191 n.141, 1193
n.148, 1196 n.164, 1198 n.168 (1955).
34. P. 338.
Vol. 92: 396, 1982
Hannah Arendt
tion about the origin and nature of intellectual lionization in the United
States. Reference could be made to the concentration of book and journal
publishers in New York City, to the value of certain personal contacts in
this milieu, or to the complex ideological atmosphere that encourages di-
verse and often even opposed lines of thought while discouraging others.
One could point to the rise of certain individuals and institutions, like The
New York Review of Books, as arbitri elegantiae intellectualis and in-
veigh against the fawning and pretentiousness that inevitably accompany
such phenomena. All of this would have some relevance to the case of
Hannah Arendt, but it would miss all that was positive about her. And no
reader can honestly come away from Young-Bruehl's biography without
the conviction that there was much that was positive about Arendt.
Arendt's last work, left unfinished at the time of her death, is entitled
The Life of the Mind. It is characteristic of her approach in its basic
division of three supposedly different types of mental activity-thinking,
judging, and willing. In the "Thinking" section, as Young-Bruehl notes, 5
Arendt makes an important distinction between "knowing-scientific cog-
nition-[which] has an object and a purpose," and "thinking [which] is
objectless and self-referential." The goal of knowing is said to be truth,
while the result, if such it can be called, of thinking is meaning."6 As
Young-Bruehl also notes, the focal point of The Life of the Mind can be
seen as sharply discrepant from the primary political concerns of her ear-
lier mature years and hence as constituting a kind of withdrawal from the
political world; however, the priority Arendt assigns to "thinking" in the
life of the mind is not really a novel turn in her own thought. If we
understand that this was always her underlying priority, no matter how
politically engaged she became, we can perhaps understand how she re-
mained relatively untroubled by charges, often quite valid, of profound
inconsistency in her political judgments as well as her theoretical con-
structions-charges that she was, as Walter Laqueur put it succinctly,
"not a political animal."137
The marvel-and I use this term positively and without irony-is that
so many others, her students and listeners and readers, were also left rela-
tively untroubled by this prosaic truth and chose instead to glean what
35. P. 449.
36. H. ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 62-64 (M. McCarthy ed. 1978). The distinction be-
tween knowing and thinking is certainly not altogether original with Arendt. One finds it strongly
emphasized in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, who often refers to what Arendt calls "knowing"
as "calculation" or "calculative thinking"; it can be traced back to German Idealism and, indeed, even
to the beginnings of Western thought.
37. Laqueur, Re-reading Hannah Arendt, ENCOUNTER, Mar. 1979, at 73, 74. The erratic fluctu-
ations in Arendt's assessment of the student protest movement of the 1960's illustrate the shakiness of
her political judgments. See pp. 412-17.
The Yale Law Journal
meanings they could from the often marvelously perceptive insights of a
person who, through all the vicissitudes of a long and often very dramatic
surface career, so completely embodied the life of the mind. In an alien
world filled with calculators of both the human and nonhuman variety,
Hannah Arendt steadfastly championed reflective thought-in particular,
reflective thought about politics-as a self-justifyi'ng activity, valuable in
itself, that transcends any inconsistencies it generates along the way.
406
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The Editors dedicate this issue to Justice Potter Stewart in tribute
to his long and distinguished career on the United States Supreme
Court. This dedication is particularly fitting given that the focus of
the issue-the First Amendment-is the centerpiece of Justice Stew-
art's judicial legacy.
Following his retirement from the Court, Justice Stewart, a for-
mer Journal Comment Editor, served as Justice-in-residence at the
Yale Law School. Many of us attended his classes and benefited
from his wide-ranging insights. We wish Justice Stewart all the best
in the years ahead.
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
